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Introduction
The task to obtain a non-cooperative foundation for a cooperative solution concept is widely described by the term Nash program. Starting with an underlying cooperative game, one needs to derive a non-cooperative game in normal or extensive form in such a way that equilibrium payoffs coincide with (or belong to) the cooperative solution. In this paper, we want to support the Kalai-Smorodinsky (hereafter KS) bargaining solution 2 in this spirit. In effect, the bargaining solution can as well be obtained by strategic interaction instead of signing an agreement. Clearly, one is interested in formulating a universal way to derive the non-cooperative game, which means that one should not make use of particular knowledge of the underlying bargaining problem.
Apparently, there are striking similarities between the Nash program and the theory of implementation, although the foci are slightly different. However, Trockel (2002) shows that for solutions concepts from cooperative game theory, a support result as discussed above can be "transformed" into an implementation result in the spirit of implementation theory (see also Serrano (1997) , Dagan & Serrano (1998) and Bergin & Duggan (1999) ). This is the content of the so-called embedding lemma. In particular, any support result for a bargaining solution readily yields an implementation result for this solution as well.
Roughly, there are two ways, in which we could think about supporting a bargaining solution. One way is to follow a purely welfaristic approach, which means that one only considers the possible allocations of utility provided in the bargaining situation and takes this set (together with the status quo point) as the primitives of the cooperative model. Along this line, Trockel (1999) discusses support results for a class of bargaining solutions including the KS solution (cf. also Haake (2000) ).
In the second direction, there is an additional entity considered in the model; a set of outcomes. This set may, for example, consist of allocations of goods or (lotteries over) alternatives. A bargaining problem is induced by evaluation of outcomes with individual utility functions. Therefore, supporting a bargaining solution in such a setup means achieving a certain outcome through strategic interaction, the utility of which coincides with the given bargaining solution. Such a non-welfaristic approach can cure an important drawback: In practice it is not necessarily clear, how a specific utility allocation is actually obtained, whereas it appears to be a much simpler task to select a certain (physical) outcome. In a seminal paper, Moulin (1984) discusses an implementation of the KS solution, using a mechanism, in which "fractions of dictatorship are auctioned off". The winning bid in the auction later constitutes a probability distribution on the set of (physical) alternatives, so that the KS solution is the expected payoff from this lottery. In a similar spirit, Miyagawa (2002) obtains a subgame-perfect implementation result for a class of bargaining solutions including the KS solution.
As Moulin's (1984) work does, we follow the second approach. We investigate an object division problem, in which a finite number of (divisible) objects may be distributed among two agents. Our approach differs from Moulin's in two respects. First, we obtain an exact support result in the sense that deterministic payoffs in equilibrium coincide with the KS solution. And second, instead of using an auction mechanism, we set up an exchange market. Payoffs (in equilibrium) are the result of individual demand. Roughly speaking, a strategy choice in the supporting games determines prices and income, that in turn yield utility maximizing allocations of objects.
We present two support results in the paper: First, we derive from any object division problem a non-cooperative game in strategic form, which has a unique Nash equilibrium. This game gives rise to a second game in extensive form. There the payoff in any subgame perfect equilibrium coincides with the KS solution. Although we cannot guarantee uniqueness of equilibria, no coordination problem occurs, as the resulting outcomes are (essentially) unique.
Notation and Framework
We investigate a market, in which finitely many objects are distributed among two agents. Let I = {1, 2} denote the set of agents and N := {1, . . . , n} the set of objects. There is exactly one unit of each object in the market. Denote by e := (1, . . . , 1) ∈ R n the vector of total endowments. We assume that objects are divisible, so that an allocation (of objects) is described by a pair
We denote the set of allocations by A. Neither agent is initially endowed with some object. We assume that agents' preferences are linear over divisions of an object and additively separable across objects. That means, agent i's preferences may be represented by a vector
The quantity u i j may be interpreted as agent i's willingness to pay for object j. Agent i's utilities over bundles are given by a function
. By U, we denote the set of all pairs of utility functions (U 1 , U 2 ) as above. For presentational reasons we will assume that for each pair in U the corresponding utility vectors
j+1 for all j = 1, . . . , n − 1, which means in particular that no two objects exhibit the same rate of substitution between the two agents. To sum, we describe a market by a tuple M = (I, N, U ) with U ∈ U.
In the sequel, we want to achieve allocations by letting agents demand objects according to specific income and prices. A price system is a vector p ∈ R n + . For given price system p and income level m ∈ R + , we define the budget set B(m, p) :
In the remainder, we make use of two specific price systems. Due to our assumption that utility functions are representable by a vector u i ∈ R n ++ , we may also view u i as a linear function to evaluate (bundles of) objects; hence, we may view u i as a specific price system. Throughout the paper, we setp i := u i (i ∈ I).
Any market (I, N, U ) induces a two person bargaining game in the following way. The set of feasible utility allocations is given by
Status quo utilities are (always) given by the origin 0 ∈ R 2 and so we identify the game with its utility possibility set V U . It is easy to see that V U can be written as a sum of utility possibility sets; one for each object separately, i.e.
. Hence, the class V := V U | U ∈ U of bargaining games generated by an object division problem is the class of games with compactly generated, polyhedral utility possibility sets.
i reflects agent i's maximal possible utility in V U . The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution is the mapping K : V −→ R 2 that takes each V U to its unique Pareto optimal utility allocation, in which both agents obtain the same fraction of their maximal utility, i.e.
We close with some important observation on the demand correspondence. Define a
That means, to each δ ∈ [0, 1] the point h(δ) is the unique Pareto efficient point in V U , in which agent 2 receives a δ share of his maximal utility. As one easily sees, h U 1 is a concave, strictly decreasing function. In the 3 We use the following notation for vector inequalities in R n : x > > y means x j > y j (j ∈ N ); x > y means x j ≥ y j (j ∈ N ) and x = y; x ≥ y means x > y or x = y.
4 Here compH(·) denotes the comprehensive hull operator.
3 following lemma we show that certain demand sets D i (m, p) are singletons. In such cases we will identify the set with its single element. Lemma 1. Let M = (I, N, U ) be a market satisfying the above assumptions.
1. For i ∈ I and m ∈ [0,
2. To each Pareto optimal utility allocation (
3. Any Pareto optimal allocation a = (a 1 , a 2 ) has the form a 1 = (1, . . . , 1, λ, 0, . . . , 0), a 2 = (0, . . . , 0, 1 − λ, 1, . . . , 1) with a 1 + a 2 = e.
U
Proof: 1) First note that for a price system p, D i (m, p) is obtained as follows. Order the objects according to their utility/price ratio, i.e. u 2) This immediately follows from our assumption that substitution rates are different across objects. Therefore, to any allocation z of objects, the utility allocation of which is Pareto optimal in V U , there does not exist a redistribution of z, so that every agent is equally well off. 3) Note that any Pareto efficient utility allocation v ∈ V U = j∈N V U j can be uniquely written as the sum of utility allocations in V U j , i.e. v = j v j . All utility allocations v j as well as v have to exhibit the same normal vector of a supporting hyperplane and, with our assumption on different substitution rates, it follows that for all but at most one j we have either v j = (u 1 j , 0) or v j = (0, u 2 j ). So, all but at most one object are completely allocated to some agent. With the assumption on the order of objects according to substitution rates, we conclude that the allocation of objects corresponding to v takes the asserted form. 4) We prove the case i = 1. Let
n |p 1 x = m } collects all bundles, the worth of which underp 1 is exactly m . Since z 2 ∈ B(m,p 1 ) (and preferences are strictly monotonic), we know thatp
2 ) is a Pareto efficient allocation, since agent 2 maximizes his utility on the budget set and agent i can only be better off, when obtaining a higher income than
. Note that as a consequence of part 1 of the lemma, we can conclude
5 In fact, the pair (p 1 ; (e − z 2 , z 2 )) constitutes a Walrasian equilibrium of the underlying economy w.r.t. to the given income distribution. See Haake (2004) for further details.
3 Support Results
Achieving a support result for a bargaining solution means executing the following task: One has to derive from each bargaining game V U a non-cooperative game Γ U , so that payoffs in equilibrium coincide with the bargaining solution applied to the bargaining game at hand. The "rules" for deriving such a game should thereby not make use of knowledge about the underlying bargaining problem, but rather describe how Γ is derived in general. Clearly, the "strength" of a support result is connected to the strength of the equilibrium concept that is used.
In this section, we will discuss two support results for the KS solution in the present context. First we describe rules for deriving a game in strategic form having exactly one Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium payoff coincides with the KS solution of the underlying bargaining game. Second, we derive a game in extensive form, which has multiple subgame perfect equilibria. However, there are no coordination problems involved, as all equilibria have s the same payoff; again the KS solution.
Payoffs in both games, respectively the final allocations of objects, are achieved by endowing agents with a specific amount of money and letting them demand objects at pricesp 1 orp 2 .
Unique Nash equilibrium support
For U ∈ U we construct a game Γ U = (S 1 , S 2 , F 1 , F 2 ) as follows: Strategy spaces are
) ∈ A of objects as follows:
Payoffs in Γ U are given by evaluation of the resulting allocation, i.e.
Theorem 1. For each U ∈ U the game Γ U has a unique Nash equilibriumγ. This is given byγ
Proof: Fix U ∈ U and set τ := τ (V U ), hence we examineγ = (τ, τ ).
Step 1: Note first, that g(γ) is determined according to (g1). With part 4 of Lemma 1, we know
Step 2: Next, we show thatγ is a Nash equilibrium in Γ U . Suppose agent 1 deviates to
, the function g is still determined according to (g1) and hence
6 Use part 1 of Lemma 1 and the fact that demand is increasing in income.
If agent 1 deviates to ρ 1 > τ , we conclude that g is determined by (g2). Suppose z 1 (ρ 1 , τ ) + (e −ẑ 1 (ρ 1 , τ )) ≤ e were true. Then (z 1 (ρ 1 , τ ), e −ẑ 1 (ρ 1 , τ )) ∈ A is a feasible allocation. Using Lemma 1 we compute its utility allocation (
, which contradicts Pareto efficiency of the KS solution. It follows again with part 5 of Lemma 1 that
has to hold. Analogous arguments apply for agent 2.
Step 3:
Step 2 shows that agent i can assure himself a payoff of τ M i by choosingγ i = τ . Therefore, the payoff in any other equilibrium has to be at least this amount for both agents. But the only utility allocation in V U that does satisfy this condition is K(V U ). It is then immediate thatγ is the only strategy profile with payoff K(V U ) and therefore the only Nash equilibrium in Γ U .
Subgame Perfect support
Next, we derive an extensive form game Σ U from a bargaining game V U ∈ V. Again, we first obtain an allocation as the result of strategy choices. The rules are as follows:
Stage 2 Agent 2 is entitled to either choose a bundle z 2 = z 2 (η) ∈ B((1 − η)M 1 ,p 1 ) or to pass to the next stage. In the former case, the final allocation is (e−z 2 , z 2 ) ∈ A.
Stage 3 Agent 1 is entitled to choose a bundle
Again, payoffs in Σ U are determined by evaluation of the final allocation with U i (·).
Theorem 2. Letz = (z 1 ,z 2 ) be the final allocation andη be the chosen parameter at Stage 1 in a subgame-perfect equilibrium of Σ U . Then we haveη = τ (V U ) and (
Proof: First, in any subgame perfect equilibrium, if either agent 2 or 1 chooses a bundle from the budget set (at stage 2 or 3), he will choose
2 ), respectively. By parts 4 and 5 of Lemma 1, we know that U 1 (e−z 2 ) = η·M 1 and U 2 (e−z 1 ) = η · M 2 , which means U 1 (z 1 ) = h U 1 (η). At stage 2, agent 2 compares his payoff from choosing z 2 himself with U 2 (e − z 1 ), which he anticipates when passing to the next round. Since the respective allocations (e − z 2 , z 2 ) and (z 1 , e − z 1 ) are Pareto efficient, we have that
. so agent 2 takes his decision as to minimize agent 1's payoff. Therefore, at stage 1, agent 1 faces a payoff of min(
. To maximize this expression, agent 1 choosesη to equate h U 1 (η) =ηM 1 . 7 Hence, h U (η) = (ηM 1 ,ηM 2 ), soη = τ (V U ) and the equilibrium payoff coincides with K(V U ).
Note that in equilibrium agent 2 is indifferent between choosing himself or letting agent 1 choose at stage 3. Nonetheless, there is no coordination problem at all, since with the unique equilibrium parameterη = τ (V U ) the resulting allocations yield the same payoffs. With our assumption on different substitution rates, agent 1 and 2 will even choose the same allocation of objects.
7 Recall that h U 1 (η) is decreasing in η.
6 constitute a material restriction. In case there are different objects having the same substitution rate, we lose the one-to-one correspondence between Pareto efficient utility and object allocations. Moreover, the demand sets in part 1 of Lemma 1 are no longer singletons. However, we will always be able to select an appropriate allocation, the utility allocation of which satisfies required properties.
The reader may dislike that there are two different price systems involved to obtain payoffs.
As Haake (2004) shows the price systemp withp j = (u 1 j ·u 2 j ) 1/2 is always an equilibrium price system and therefore individual demand leads to an efficient allocation. As it is basically shown there, we get support results for the superadditive bargaining solution introduced by Perles & Maschler (1981) . If one replacesp i byp in Γ U (Σ U ), the results go through with K(V U ) replaced by the PM solution. The equilibrium strategies in Γ U are given bȳ γ = (1/2, 1/2) as well asη = 1/2 in Σ U .
